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Abstract
We consider in this paper a simple model for human interactions as service providers of different
resources over social networks, and study the dynamics of selfish behavior of such social entities using
a game-theoretic model known as binary-preference capacitated selfish replication (CSR) game. It is
known that such games have an associated ordinal potential function, and hence always admit a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium (NE). We study the price of anarchy of such games, and show that it is
bounded above by 3; we further provide some instances for which the price of anarchy is at least 2.
We also devise a quasi-polynomial algorithm O(n2+lnD) which can find, in a distributed manner, an
allocation profile that is within a constant factor of the optimal allocation, and hence of any pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium of the game, where the parameters n, and D denote, respectively, the number
of players, and the diameter of the network. We further show that when the underlying network has a
tree structure, every globally optimal allocation is a Nash equilibrium, which can be reached in only
linear time.
Index Terms
Capacitated selfish replication game; pure Nash equilibrium (NE); potential function; quasi-polynomial
algorithm; price of anarchy; optimal allocation.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a wide range of studies on the role of social and distributed
networks in various disciplinary areas such as economics, computer science, epidemiology, and
engineering. In particular, availability of large data from online social networks and advances
in control of distributed systems have drawn the attention of many researchers to model various
phenomena in social and distributed networks using some mathematical tools such as game
theory in order to exploit some of the hidden properties of such networks. Such studies not
only improve our understanding of the complex nature of social and distributed events, but also
enable us to devise more efficient algorithms toward some desired outcomes in such networks.
Due to accelerated growth of economic networks and advances in using game-theoretic tools
in various applications, modeling of distributed network storage has become an important issue.
In general, distributed network storage games or resource allocation games are characterized by
a set of agents who compete for the same set of resources [1], [2], and arise in a wide variety of
contexts such as congestion games [3], [4], [5], load balancing [6], peer-to-peer systems [7], web-
caches [8], content management [7], and market sharing games [9]. Among many problems that
arise in such a context, one that stands out is distributed replication, which not only improves
the availability of resources for users, but also increases the reliability of the entire network
with respect to customer requests [10], [11]. However, one of the main challenges in modeling
resource allocation problems using game-theoretic tools is to answer the question of to what
extent such models can predict the desired optimal allocations over a given network. Modeling
a system as a game, ideally one would like for the set of equilibria or person-by-person optimal
solutions of the game to be as close as possible to the desired states of the system. In fact, the
price of anarchy (PoA) [12] is one of the metrics in game theory that measures efficiency and
the extent to which a system degrades due to selfish behavior of its agents; it has been used
extensively in the literature [7], [9], [13], [10].
Distributed replication games with servers that have access to all the resources and are
accessible at some cost by users have been studied in [14]. Moreover, the uncapacitated selfish
replication game where the agents have access to the set of all resources was studied in [10],
where the authors were able to characterize the set of equilibrium points based on the parameters
of the problem. However, unlike the uncapacitated case, there is no comparable characterization
of equilibrium points in capacitated selfish replication games. In fact, when the agents have
3limited capacity, the situation could be much more complicated as the constraint couples the
actions of agents much more than in the uncapacitated case or in replication games with servers.
Typically, capacitated selfish replication games are defined in terms of a set of available
resources for each player, where the players are allowed to communicate through an undirected
communication graph. Such a communication graph identifies the access cost among the players,
and the goal for each player is to satisfy his/her customers’ needs with minimum cost. Ideally, and
in order to avoid any additional cost, each player only wants to use his/her own set of resources.
However, due to limitation on capacity, players do not have access to all the resources and hence,
they incur some cost by traveling over the network and borrowing some of the resources which
are not available in their own caches from others in order to meet their customers’ demands.
The problem of finding an equilibrium for capacitated selfish replication games in the case of
hierarchical networks was studied in [8]. Moreover, the class of capacitated selfish replication
games with binary preferences has been studied in [8], [15], where “binary preferences” captures
the behavioral pattern where players are equally interested in some objects.
In this paper, we consider the capacitated selfish replication game with binary preferences.
In this model players act myopically and selfishly, while they are required to fully satisfy their
customers’ needs. Note that, although the players act in a selfish manner with respect to others
in satisfying their customer needs, their actions are closely coupled with the others’ and they do
not have absolute freedom in the selection of their actions. It was shown in [8] that when the
number of resources is 2, there exists a polynomial time algorithm O(n3) to find an equilibrium.
This result has been improved in [15] to a linear time algorithm when the number of resources
is bounded above by 5. However, in general there exist only exponential time algorithms for
finding a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In this work we consider such games over general
undirected networks and devise a quasi-polynomial algorithm which drives the system to an
allocation profile whose total cost lies within a constant factor of that in any pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium. In particular, we show that the price of anarchy, i.e., the ratio of the highest cost
among Nash equilibrium points to the overall minimum cost of an optimal allocation, is in
general bounded above by 3.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce capacitated selfish replication
games with binary preferences over general undirected networks. We review some salient prop-
erties of such games and include some relevant existing results on this problem. In Section III,
4we provide an upper bound on the price of anarchy of such games and also an upper bound on
the optimal allocation cost. In Section IV we devise a quasi-polynomial algorithm which can
reach an allocation profile within a constant factor of the optimal allocation profile, and hence
of any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We conclude the paper with identifying future directions
of research in Section V.
Notations: For a positive integer n, we let [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}. For a vector v ∈ Rn, we
let vi be the ith entry of v. We use G = ([n], E) for an undirected underlying network with a
node set {1, 2, . . . , n} and an edge set E . For any two nodes i, j ∈ [n], we let dG(i, j) be the
graphical distance between them, that is, the length of a shortest path which connects i and j.
The diameter of a graph, denoted by D, is the maximum distance between any pair of vertices,
that is, D = maxi,j∈[n] dG(i, j). We let dmin and dmax denote the minimum and the maximum
degree in the graph G, respectively. Moreover, for an arbitrary node i ∈ [n] and an integer r ≥ 0,
we define a ball of radius r and center i to be the set of all the nodes in the graph G whose
graphical distance to the node i is at most r, i.e., B(i, r) = {x ∈ V|dG(i, x) ≤ r}. We denote a
specific Nash equilibrium and a specific optimal allocation by P ∗ and P o, respectively. Finally,
we use |S| to denote the cardinality of a finite set S.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND EXISTING RESULTS
In this section we first introduce the capacitated selfish replication game with binary prefer-
ences as was introduced in [8]. In the balance of this paper, our focus will be on such games,
which for simplicity we refer to as CSR games.
A. CSR Game Model
We start with a set of [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} nodes (players) which are connected by an undirected
graph G = ([n], E). We denote the set of all resources by O = {o1, o2, . . . , ok}. For simplicity,
but without much loss of generality, we assume that each node can hold only one resource in
its cache. All the results can in fact be extended to CSR games with different capacities (see
Remark 1 below). Moreover, we assume that each node has access to all the resources. For a
particular allocation P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn), we define the sum cost function Ci(P ) of the ith
player as follows:
Ci(P ) =
∑
o∈O\{Pi}
dG(i, σi(P, o)), (1)
5where σi(P, o) is i’s nearest node holding o in P . Given an allocation profile P we define the
radius of agent i, denoted by ri(P ), to be the distance between node i and the nearest node
other than her holding the same resource as i, i.e., ri(P ) = minj 6=i,Pj=Pi dG(i, j). Note that if
there does not exist such a node, we simply define ri(P ) = D, where D is the diameter of the
network. We suppress the dependence of ri(P ) on P whenever there is no ambiguity. Finally,
If some resource o is missing in an allocation profile P , we define the cost of each player for
that specific resource to be very large such as D + 1.
Remark 1. Actually all the proofs in this paper can be carried over to games with varying
capacities by constructing a new network which transfers games with different cache sizes to
one with unit size caches [15], [8].
Remark 2. Given two allocation profiles P and P˜ which only differ in the ith coordinate, using
(1) and the definition of the radius, one can easily see that Ci(P ) − Ci(P˜ ) = ri(P˜ ) − ri(P ).
This establishes an equivalence between decrease in cost and increase in radius for player i,
when the actions of the other players are fixed.
It has been shown in [8] that the CSR game has an associated ordinal potential function, and
hence, it has at least one pure Nash equilibrium. However, the number of best responses to reach
an equilibrium can in general be exponentially large (O(nD)). Therefore, the main challenge
here is to find an efficient way to arrive at an equilibrium or at least to be close enough to an
equilibrium.
B. Least Best Response Algorithm
It was shown earlier in [15] that the following algorithm known as the least best response
algorithm will find a pure Nash equilibrium of the CSR game when the number of resources is
low or the underlying network is “dense enough” with respect to the number of resources.
Least Best Response Algorithm 1: Given a CSR game, at each time t = 1, 2, . . ., and from
all the agents who want to update, we select an agent with the least radius and let her update
be based on her best response. Ties are broken arbitrarily.
Theorem 1. ([15]) In the binary CSR game with n agents and network diameter D, let T denote
6the convergence time of the least best response algorithm to a pure Nash equilibrium. Then,
T ≤
3n
3min{|O| − 1, D}, if |O| ≤ dmin
nmin{D, |O| − 1}, if |O| < 5,
In the remainder of this paper, we provide substantial improvements to these results. We
provide a constant approximation algorithm which works in quasi-polynomial time over general
networks and without any extra assumption on the structure of the network. Roughly speaking,
this algorithm reduces the time complexity of being close to an equilibrium from the naive search
of O(nD) to O(nlnD).
III. PRICE OF ANARCHY FOR THE CSR GAME
In this section, we show that all the equilibrium points of the CSR game are almost as good
as the global optimal allocation, i.e., an allocation profile which minimizes the total sum of the
costs of the players.
Theorem 2. The price of anarchy in the CSR game is bounded from above by 3.
Proof: For an arbitrary equilibrium P ∗ and a specific node i with equilibrium radius r∗i ,
i.e., r∗i = dG(i, σi(P
∗, P ∗i )), we note that all the resources must appear at least once in B(i, r
∗
i ).
In fact, if a specific resource is missing in B(i, r∗i ), then node i can increase its radius by
updating its current resource to that specific resource, thereby decreasing its cost. But this is in
contradiction with P ∗ being an equilibrium (Figure 1). Now, given the equilibrium profile P ∗,
let us define rˆi to be the smallest integer such that B(i, rˆi) contains at least two resources of
the same type, i.e.,
rˆi = min
{
r ∈ N : ∀j, k ∈ B(i, r−1), P ∗j 6= P ∗k , and ∃j0, k0 ∈ B(i, r), P ∗j0 = P ∗k0
}
.
Now we claim that all the resources must appear at least once in B(i, 3rˆi). To see this and
by the above definition, let j0 6= k0 ∈ B(i, rˆi) be such that P ∗j0 = P ∗k0 . This means that the
equilibrium radius of node j0, i.e., r∗j0 in P
∗ is at most dG(j0, i) + dG(i, k0) ≤ 2rˆi. On the other
hand, by the argument at the beginning of the proof, all the resources must appear at least once
in B(j0, 2rˆi). But since B(j0, 2rˆi) ⊆ B(i, 3rˆi), this shows that B(i, 3rˆi) must include all the
resources at least once.
7Fig. 1: Illustration of resource allocation in Nash equilibrium P ∗. Note that r∗j0 denotes the radius
of node j0 at equilibrium P ∗ which is upper bounded by dG(j0, k0). The ball B(i, rˆi−1) contains
only resources of different types.
Next, let us denote an optimal allocation profile by P o, and the cost of node i in the optimal
allocation and Nash equilibrium by Ci(P o) and Ci(P ∗), respectively. Now for the equilibrium
P ∗ and since by the definition of rˆi there are no two similar resources in B(i, rˆi−1), and all
the resources appear at least once in B(i, 3rˆi), we can write
Ci(P
∗) ≤
∑
j∈B(i,rˆi−1)
dG(i, j)+3rˆi(|O|−1−|B(i, rˆi−1)|). (2)
On the other hand, for the cost of node i in the optimal allocation P o we can write,
Ci(P
o) ≥
∑
j∈B(i,rˆi−1)
dG(i, j)+rˆi(|O|−1−|B(i, rˆi−1)|), (3)
where the inequality holds since node i has to pay at least
∑
j∈B(i,rˆi−1) dG(i, j) for the first
|B(i, rˆi−1)| closest resources, and to pay at least rˆi for the remaining (|O| − 1− |B(i, rˆi−1)|)
resources. By comparing relations (2) and (3), it is not hard to see that Ci(P
∗)
Ci(P o)
is at most∑
j∈B(i,rˆi−1) dG(i, j) + 3rˆi (|O| − 1− |B(i, rˆi−1)|)∑
j∈B(i,rˆi−1) dG(i, j) + rˆi (|O| − 1− |B(i, rˆi−1)|)
,
which is bounded from above by 3. Since node i and the equilibrium P ∗ were chosen arbitrarily,
for every equilibrium P ∗ and for all i ∈ V (G), we have Ci(P ∗) ≤ 3Ci(P o). Summing this
inequality over all i ∈ V (G) we get C(P ∗) = ∑iCi(P ∗) ≤ 3∑iCi(P o) = 3C(P o). Since
we have this inequality for all possible Nash equilibria, and using the definition of the price of
anarchy, we have PoA = maxP∗∈NE C(P
∗)
C(P o)
≤ 3.
8Next in the following we provide an example which shows that for some network configura-
tions, the price of anarchy of the CSR game can actually be arbitrarily close to 2.
Example 1. Given arbitrary positive integers m, |O| ≥ 2, let us consider a network of n :=
(m+1)(|O|−1) nodes (players) as shown in Figure 2. Here we assume that |O| is the number of
resources {o1, o1, . . . , o|O|} in the CSR game over this network. The bottom part of the network is
composed of a clique of |O|−1 nodes, and the top part forms an independent set of m(|O|−1)
nodes which all are connected to the bottom part. As it can be seen in Figure 2, the top
figure constitutes a pure Nash equilibrium for the CSR game with the total cost of C(P ∗) =
m(|O|−1)(2|O|−3)+(|O|−1)2. Moreover, it can easily be seen that the bottom figure illustrates
an optimal allocation, where the cost of each node is |O| − 1, and hence the total optimal cost
equals C(P o) = (m + 1)(|O| − 1)2. Thus, we have C(P ∗)
C(P o)
= 2 −
(
m+|O|−1
(m+1)(|O|−1)
)
. This shows
that for large m and |O|, the price of anarchy of the CSR game over such networks can be
arbitrarily close to 2.
Fig. 2: Illustration of the resource allocation for a Nash equilibrium (top figure), and an optimal
allocation (bottom figure) in Example 1.
Before concluding, we provide in the theorem below an upper bound on the minimum social
cost in the general CSR game, which uses a probabilistic argument.
Theorem 3. For a network G with vertex degrees di, i ∈ [n], the optimal allocation cost for the
CSR game is bounded above by n(2|O| − 1) + |O|(|O| − 1)∑ni=1 (1− 1|O|)di .
9Proof: Let us assign with probability 1|O| and independently a resource to any of the vertices
of G. Now for an arbitrary but fixed node i, dG(i, σi(o, P )) is a random variable denoting the
graphical distance between player i and the player closest to him who has resource o under
such a random resource allocation P . For any nonnegative integer r and any arbitrary but fixed
resource o ∈ O, we have
P
{
dG(i, σi(o, P )) ≥ r
}
=

(
1− 1|O|
)|B(i,r−1)|
if 0 ≤ r ≤ D+1
0 else.
Note that for r = 0 we have B(i, r − 1) = ∅, and hence, |B(i, r − 1)| = 0. Therefore, using
the tail formula for expectation of discrete random variables, the expected distance of player i
from resource o is
∑∞
r=1 P(dG(i, σi(o, P )) ≥ r). Hence, the total expected cost of such random
assignment for all players and all resources is
E[C(P )] =
∑
o∈O
n∑
i=1
∞∑
r=0
P(dG(i, σi(o, P )) ≥ r)
= |O|
n∑
i=1
D+1∑
r=0
(
1− 1|O|
)|B(i,r−1)|
= |O|
n∑
i=1
(
1 +
(
1− 1|O|
)
+
D+1∑
r=2
(
1− 1|O|
)|B(i,r−1)|)
< n(2|O| − 1) + |O|
n∑
i=1
∞∑
k=di+1
(
1− 1|O|
)k
= n(2|O| − 1) + |O|(|O| − 1)
n∑
i=1
(
1− 1|O|
)di
.
This shows that there exists at least one resource assignment where the total cost is at most
n(2|O| − 1) + |O|(|O| − 1)∑ni=1 (1− 1|O|)di .
Remark 3. One can easily check that for the line graph, the bound in Theorem 3 is tight up to
a constant factor.
IV. QUASI-POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM
In this section we show that for the CSR game over general networks, one can obtain an
allocation profile whose total cost lies within a constant factor of that in an optimal allocation
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in only quasi-polynomial time. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given a number  > 1, at every time instance there exists an agent i who can increase
its radius by a factor of at least  by playing its best response. Dynamics thus generated terminate
after no longer than O(n2Dlog n) steps.
Proof: Given a profile P (t) = (P1(t), . . . , Pn(t)) at time t, let us denote the radii of
the players by r1(t), . . . , rn(t), and let nk(t) be the number of players whose radii are k, for
k = 1, 2, . . . , D. Now, given that at time step t player i with Pi(t) = o1 wants to change to
Pi(t+ 1) = o2, it means that at time step t, there is no resource of type o2 in B(i, ri) (Figure
3). Now, let us define a potential function R(t) to be
R(t) :=
D∑
k=1
nk(t)
klog n
=
n∑
k=1
1
(rk(t))log n
, (4)
where the equality holds since by definition of nk(t), exactly nk(t) of the terms in
∑n
k=1
1
(rk(t))log n
are equal to 1
klog n
. Moreover, one can easily see that R(·) is a nonnegative function which is
upper bounded by n. We will show that after each time of running the dynamics, the value of
the potential function given in (4) decreases by at least 1
n‖{rmax(t)}‖log n∞
, where ‖{rmax(t)}‖∞ =
maxt≥0maxi∈[n] ri(t). To see this, let us assume that node i updates its radius from ri(t) to
ri(t+ 1) ≥ ri(t). Therefore, for some k ∈ [n] we must have one of the following three cases:
• If k = i, then ri(t+ 1) ≥ ri(t). This holds due to the dynamics rule, since node i updates
its radius from ri(t) to ri(t+ 1) if and only if ri(t+ 1) ≥ ri(t).
• If rk(t) < ri(t + 1), then rk(t + 1) ≥ rk(t). To see this, note that if rk(t) < ri(t + 1),
then Pk(t) 6= o2. Moreover, either Pk(t) = o1, where in this case by updating Pi(t) from
Pi(t) = o1 to Pi(t+1) = o2, the radius of node k does not decrease, i.e., rk(t+1) ≥ rk(t), or
Pk(t) 6= o1, where in this case the radius of node k remains the same, i.e., rk(t+1) = rk(t).
• If rk(t) ≥ ri(t+1), then ri(t+1) ≤ rk(t+1). To show this, first note that if Pk 6= o1, o2, then
the radius of node k does not change after node i updates, i.e., rk(t+1) = rk(t) ≥ ri(t+1).
Otherwise, either Pk(t) = o1, which in this case rk(t + 1) ≥ rk(t) ≥ ri(t + 1) due to the
fact that after update we have fewer number of o1-resources, or pk(t) = o2 in which case
the radius of player k cannot decrease to less than the graphical distance between k and i,
thus rk(t+1)≥rk(t)≥ri(t+1).
Using the fact that ri(t+1) ≥ ri(t) and considering the above three possibilities, we can write
11
Fig. 3: Illustration of updating node i in the Lemma 1. Note that there no other resource of type
o2 in B(i, ri(t+1)).
R(t+ 1)−R(t) =
n∑
k=1
(
1
(rk(t+ 1))log n
− 1
(rk(t))log n
)
=
1
(ri(t+ 1))log n
− 1
(ri(t))log n
+
∑
{k 6=i:rk(t)<ri(t+1)}
(
1
(rk(t+ 1))log n
− 1
(rk(t))log n
)
+
∑
{k:rk(t)≥ri(t+1)}
(
1
(rk(t+ 1))log n
− 1
(rk(t))log n
)
≤ ( 1
n
− 1)
(
1
(ri(t))log n
)
+ 0 +
|{k : rk(t) ≥ ri(t+ 1)}|
n(ri(t))log n
≤ ( 1
n
− 1)
(
1
(ri(t))log n
)
+
n− 2
n(ri(t))log n
=
−1
n(ri(t))log n
≤ −1
n‖{rmax(t)}‖log n∞
,
where in the second to last inequality, and without any loss of generality, we can consider
|{k : rk(t) ≥ ri(t + 1)}| ≤ n − 2. In fact, we argue that at most for D instances we can have
|{k : rk(t) ≥ ri(t + 1)}| ≥ n − 2, which does not really change the quasi-polynomial order
of the termination time. Note that at least i /∈ {k : rk(t) ≥ ri(t + 1)}, thus |{k : rk(t) ≥
ri(t + 1)}| ≤ n − 1. Moreover |{k : rk(t) ≥ ri(t + 1)}| cannot be equal to n − 1 more
than D steps, since by Lemma 1 in [15] every time that |{k : rk(t) ≥ ri(t + 1)}| = n − 1,
then after updating node i at the next time step the minimum index of the positive entries in
n(t+1) = (n1(t+1), n2(t+1), . . . , nD(t+1)) will increase by at least 1, which cannot happen
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for more than D steps.
Finally, since R(·) is upper bounded by n, R(·) cannot decrease more that n2‖{rmax(t)}‖log n∞
times, which shows that the dynamics must terminate after at most O
(
n2‖{rmax(t)}‖log n∞
)
steps. Moreover, since for all t = 0, 1, . . . and i ∈ [n], ri(t) cannot exceed the diameter D of
the network, ‖{rmax(t)}‖∞ ≤ D. This shows that the dynamics must terminate after at most
O
(
n2Dlog n
)
steps.
Next we introduce a useful definition.
Definition 1. Given an undirected network G = ([n], E), and an allocation profile P , the
resource-radius of any node i is the smallest positive integer γi such that all the resources
appear at least once in B(i, γi) for that given profile P .
In what follows, we introduce an algorithm, called -best response algorithm, which in at
most quasi-polynomial time can find an allocation profile which lies within a constant factor of
an optimal allocation in the CSR game.
-Best Response Algorithm 2: Given a network G = ([n], E), a number  > 1, and an arbitrary
initial allocation profile P (0), at every time instance we select an agent i who can increase its
radius ri(t) by a factor of at least , and let her to play her best response (ties are broken
arbitrarily).
Example 2. Through this example, we illustrate how the -best response algorithm works. Let
 = 2, and consider a network of 10 nodes and 4 available resources O = {o1, o2, o3, o4}. The
initial profile of allocated resources has been illustrated in Figure 4. Let us assume that at the
first time instant node i has been selected by the algorithm. Since the radius of node i in the
initial profile is 1, i.e., ri(0) = 1, among the resources whose distances to node i are at least
ri(0) = 2 × 1(in this example {o3, o4}), she will play her best response, i.e., o3. Therefore,
Pi(1) = o3. Now at the second time instant, and given that node j is selected, since rj(1) = 1,
among the resources whose distances to j are at least rj(1) = 2×1 (in this example only {o4}),
she will play her best response, i.e., Pj(2) = o4. Note that if the set of available resources where
an agent is supposed to choose her best resource from is empty at some time instant, then she
will not update.
In the following theorem we prove that the allocation profile reached after executing Algorithm
13
Fig. 4: Resource allocation in the -best response algorithm (Example 2).
2 is a constant approximation of the optimal allocation in the CSR game.
Theorem 4. The -best response algorithm provides a (2 + 1)-approximation of the optimal
allocation after at most O
(
n2Dlog n
)
steps.
Proof: First, we note that by Lemma 1 the -best response algorithm terminates after at
most O
(
n2Dlog n
)
steps. Therefore, we only need to show that the final profile P is indeed
within a constant factor of the optimal allocation. For any arbitrary i ∈ [n], suppose that γi
is the resource-radius of node i at the final profile P . We now claim that B(i, γi−1
2+1
) contains
only different resources. To see this, let us assume by contradiction that there are two nodes
j, j′ ∈ B(i, γi−1
2+1
) which share the same resource, i.e., P j = P j′ . Since j, j′ ∈ B(i, γi−12+1),
dG(j, j′) ≤ 2(γi−1)2+1 . This shows that rj ≤ 2(γi−1)2+1 , and hence, rj ≤ 2(γi−1)2+1 . In particular, since
dG(j, i) ≤ γi−12+1 , B(j, rj) ⊆ B(i, 2(γi−1)2+1 + γi−12+1) = B(i, γi − 1). Since we assumed that P is
the final allocation of the algorithm, every resource must appear at least once in B(j, rj), as
otherwise node j can update its resource to another one which is outside of B(j, rj). But, by
definition of resource-radius γi, we know that for the profile P there exists at least one resource
which is missing in B(i, γi − 1). This is in contradiction with B(j, rj) ⊆ B(i, γi − 1), which
implies that all the resources in B(i, γi−1
2+1
) are different.
Finally, as we have shown above, for every agent i, the final profile P at the termination of
Algorithm 2 has the property that all the vertices in B(i, γi−1
2+1
) have different resources, while
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all the resources appear at least once in B(i, γi). Thus we have
Ci(P ) ≤
∑
j∈B(i, γi−1
2+1
)
dG(i, j) + γi
(
|O|−1−|B(i, γi − 1
2+ 1
)|
)
,
where the inequality holds due to the definition of γi. On the other hand, for the cost of node i
in the optimal placement, we can write
Ci(P
o) ≥
∑
j∈B(i, γi−1
2+1
)
dG(i, j)+(
γi
2+1
)
(
|O|−1−|B(i, γi − 1
2+1
)|
)
,
where the above inequality holds since node i in the optimal allocation P o has to pay at
least
∑
j∈B(i, γi−1
2+1
)
dG(i, j) for the first |B(i, γi−12+1)| closest resources, and to pay an integer
cost strictly larger than γi−1
2+1
(at least ( γi
2+1
)), for the remaining (|O| − 1 − |B(i, γi−1
2+1
)|) re-
sources. By comparing the above two relations, it is not hard to see that for all i ∈ [n],
we have Ci(P ) ≤ (2 + 1)Ci(P o). Summing all of these inequalities for i ∈ [n], we get
C(P ) ≤ (2+ 1)C(P o).
Corollary 1. Replacing  = e in the result of Theorem 4, one can easily see that Algorithm
2 gives us an allocation profile within a constant factor of the optimal allocation and any NE
after at most O (n2Dlnn) = O (n2+lnD) steps.
Before concluding, we state the following theorem for the case where the underlying network
has a tree structure. We omit the proof here due to space limitation, but we include it in the full
version of the paper [16].
Theorem 5. Assume that the network in the CSR game is a tree of n nodes. Then every optimal
allocation P o must be a NE. Furtheremore, there is an algorithm which reaches an optimal
allocation in only n steps.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the binary-preference capacitated selfish replication (CSR)
game over general networks. We have provided a distributed quasi-polynomial time algorithm
O
(
n2+lnD
)
which can approximate any NE of the system within a constant factor. Moreover,
we have shown that such games benefit from having a low price of anarchy.
As an avenue for future research, one possibility is to study the dynamic version of the CSR
game, in the spirit of what has been discussed in [17] and [18].
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